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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the move for integration in banking services in
Western Europe as part of the movement toward "Europe 1992". The
main conlusion is that the pressures of domestic economic and
political considerations as well as changes in the character of
international finance have inhibited some European Community
governments in their efforts to comply with the regulations of
1992. This in turn could lead to a slowing down of the movement
for European integration.
The study employs a multidisciplinary approach combining economic
evaluation with political analysis. This multi-disciplinary
framework is applied to a discussion of EC history and the 1992
banking regulations. Subsequently, the framework is used to
examine the cases of the German and UK banking industries.
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4I. INTRODUCTION: EUROPE 1992 AND THE BANKING INDUSTRY
The financial sector accounts for three percent of the gross
domestic product and six percent of the employment of the
twelve European Community (EC) countries. 1 The changes
associated with the "movement" towards "Europe 1992" are
expected to have a profound effect on this sector.2 In
fact, some writers consider the financial sector to be the
arena where the success or failure of the movement will be
determined. While this may be an exaggeration there is no
doubt that the financial sector is crucial to the success of
the "Europe 1992" movement.
This paper studies the potential impact of the movement
towards 1992 on banking, the industry in the financial
sector that is expected to see some of the most far-reaching
changes. Banking presents a fascinating business case study
for students of European integration, as it combines
1 Nicholas Colchester and David Buchan, Europower (London: The
Economist Books, 1990).
2 Paolo Cecchini et al., The European Challenge 1992: The
Benefits of a Single Market (Aldershot: Wildwood House for the EC
Commission, 1988).
5revolutionary competitive and strategic changes with equally
fundamental alterations in business-government relations.
Not only will this most international of industries be
further opened to international pressures, but the central
banks that govern domestic banking environments will
themselves have new roles. If the architects of 1992 are to
have their way, we could even see a giant central bank that
supersedes the authority of the national central banks.
In view of the multi-dimensional nature of the effects of
"Europe 1992" on banking, this study attempts to combine
economic analysis with a historical perspective as well as
two paradigms of analysis borrowed from political science.
With the help of this multi-disciplinary analysis the paper
comes to the conclusion that domestic political
considerations may set up major obstacles on the path to
banking integration. While this is not a particularly
revolutionary finding in itself, the paper will show that
current events in the European financial world already show
a pattern of withdrawal from the initial euphoria of
European unity. In particular, the situation of the German
banking industry shows clear signs that the strains imposed
by German unification have significantly altered the
government's stance on a number of crucial integration
issues. Similar signs appear on the UK banking scene.
Changes in the attitudes of governments (especially the
German government) towards the banking components of "Europe
1992" will inevitably retard the progression of the
integration program.
Section II below introduces the analytical frameworks used
in the study. Section III discusses the historical
background of the movement towards European integration. In
Section IV, an analysis of contemporary EC banking and
finance legislation is provided. A discussion of modern
trends in international banking is provided in Section V.
Sections VI and VII study the German and UK banking
industries respectively and analyze the patterns of
business-government relations and competitive pressures in
terms of the frameworks described in Section II. Finally,
Section VIII ties the various arguments together and
presents the conclusions of the study.
7II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS
This section describes the four analytical frameworks used
in the study. Two of these are borrowed from business
analysis: Porter's "five forces model"3 and his "Diamond"
of national competitive advantage.' The other two are
borrowed from political science: Katzenstein's "strong
state/weak state" paradigm5 and the "policy network" model
originated by Katzenstein and developed by Atkinson and
Coleman.'
II. 1. THE FIVE FORCES MODEL
Michael Porter's five forces model is probably the most
widely used framework of analysis for industry competitive
3 Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for
Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New York: The Free Press,
1980).
4 Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New
York: The Free Press, 1990).
5 Peter J. Katzenstein, "Conclusion", in Peter J. Katzenstein,
ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: The University Of Wisconsin
Press, 1977).
6 Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, "Strong States
and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks", British Journal of
Political Science, 19 (1989).
8structure, and it is especially useful for a study of the
banking industry. The model posits five main determinants
of the competitive position of a firm in an industry:
rivalry among existing competitors, bargaining power of
suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, the threat of new
entrants and the threat of substitute products or
services.'
While postponing a discussion of its applicability to
specific examples until Sections VI and VII, some time can
be spent here sketching in the general points of the model.
"Europe 1992" is expected to dramatically effect the
relative positions of banks in Europe, as falling national
boundaries will alter the dynamics of competition.8 For
example, some banks may gain through economies of scale in
technology and manpower, while others will be less
successful. This could lead to concentration in the
industry as weaker players drop out and the survivors
consolidate and expand. The movement towards 1992 may also
affect the bargaining power of suppliers and customers, if a
7 Porter, Competitive Strategy.
8 Cecchini et al., op. cit.
similar concentration leaves supplier and buyer industries
with stronger and bigger firms. Similarly, the threat of
new entrants from outside Europe (or new intra-European
rivals) will also be affected, depending on the extent of
financial integration and the nature of protective
legislation. Finally, banks could be threatened if
investment banks or insurance companies developed the
ability to poach on their preserves as the result of new
legislation.
II. 2. THE "DIAMOND" OF NATIONAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
Porter's paradigm of national competitive advantage involves
a "diamond" of interlinked determinants of competitiveness:
firm strategy/structure/rivalry, general factor conditions,
demand conditions and finally related and supporting
industries. 9 The first set of determinants can be studied
with the help of the "five forces" model described in II. 1.
above. Factor conditions for banking would include items
such as labor, technology and infrastructure. An important
consequence of 1992 will be the increased mobility of labor,
9 Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations
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as immigration law is relaxed within the EC; clearly, this
could have major long term consequences for banking if
competition for skilled professionals goes up. Similarly,
legislative changes may affect technology and infrastructure
(which are crucial in the banking industry). New demand
conditions could include more sophisticated and powerful
customers and a rapid pace of product innovation. Finally,
related industries such as information technology, insurance
and investment banking will also have changing roles under
the new competitive conditions after 1992.
It will be noted that neither of Porter's models mentions
the influence of government. While Porter's analysis does
not neglect this vital component of the business
environment, this writer feels that any study involving
Europe 1992 must necessarily include government in a more
explicit manner. The following subsections are devoted to
the political frameworks used in the paper.
II. 3. THE STRONG STATE/WEAK STATE PARADIGM
Katzenstein's framework for analyzing the nature and causes
11
of state policy in the political and economic arenas is
useful for a study of this type. His basic idea is to
divide states into strong and weak according to whether
their political infrastructures and mechanisms of control
are centralized or decentralized.10 For example, Japan is
characterized in this paradigm as a strong state because the
government and bureaucracy are highly centralized and
exercise strong control over foreign and economic policy.
The US is a classic example of a weak state, owing to its
lack of a centralized bureaucracy and its relatively looser
control over economic and business affairs. Countries such
as Germany lie somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. The
UK, however, is harder to categorize: while it possesses
many characteristics of a strong state, British governments
no longer play a highly interventionist role in the UK
business world. The paradigm fails altogether when
confronted by paradoxes such as the position of the defense
industries in the US and France: the US is classed as weak
and France as strong, but both governments play a highly
interventionist role in their defense industries.
10 Katzenstein, op. cit.
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Despite these weaknesses, the Katzenstein paradigm is useful
because it works as a convenient organizing principle when
studying a problem such as the impact of "Europe 1992" on
banking. Given the nature of the industry and its intimate
connection with macroeconomic policy and national
sovereignty, government responses to external factors such
as pan-European integration are bound to have a profound
impact on banking conditions. As will be seen in Sections
VI and VII, the strong state/weak state paradigm helps to
understand the nature of government policies as the UK and
Germany attempt to balance domestic considerations against
the forces of European integration.
II. 4. POLICY NETWORKS
The policy network paradigm (originally developed by
Katzenstein) is extended by Atkinson and Coleman to
supplement the strong state/weak state idea. In this
system, greater attention is paid to the different levels at
which the state interacts with the economy. At these lower
levels, there exist "specific bureaucratic arrangements
and... relationships with key societal actors which... form
13
the core of "policy networks" at the sectoral level.""
These policy networks are the arenas within which various
actors in a sector interact with each other to create
government policy. For example, in the US banking industry
the policy networks would include the Department of the
Treasury, the Federal Reserve, Congress (with its various
banking committees), bank lobbying organizations, individual
banks, or any combination of these. In a country such as
Japan where government-business links are very strong,
individual banks and even in some cases their officers could
have a significant impact on government policy. Sections VI
and VII will show how banking policy in the UK and Germany
can be understood in terms of these policy networks.
Having introduced the analytical frameworks used in this
study, the next step is to provide a brief historical
account of the development of the EC. A knowledge of the
historical background is essential if the banking
regulations discussed in Section IV are to be understood.
"1 Atkinson and Coleman, op. cit., p. 47
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III. THE ROAD TO EUROPE 1992: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
III. 1. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
The postwar movement for unification in Europe can be traced
back to the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which was
founded in 1947." The ECE was a UN regional organization
whose purpose was to initiate reconstruction projects in
Europe. Unfortunately, the cold war made it very difficult
for the Commission to function effectively and it soon
became moribund. In the same year, the Committee for
European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) was founded under US
sponsorship. This in turn led to the creation of the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in
1948. The OEEC was basically an aid organization that aimed
at European development under the aegis of the Marshall
Plan; US support of European integration was thus firm from
the very beginning.13 The formation of the Council of
Europe in 1949 marked the end of this early stage on the
12 Dennis Swan, The Economics of the Common Market, Sixth
Edition, (Penguin Books: 1990).
13 Stanley Hoffman, "The European Community and 1992", Foreign
Affairs, vol. 68 (Fall 1989).
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road towards 1992.
III. 2. EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY
The first major proposal leading to the eventual formation
of the European Economic Community (EEC) was the Schumann
Plan of 1950.". The Plan proposed the pooling of France and
Germany's coal and steel capacities under a supranational
authority to which other nations might accede. Jean Monnet
was instrumental in developing the Plan, which resulted in
the treaty ratifying the establishment of the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. West Germany, France,
Italy and the Benelux countries were the members of the
Community (the UK refused to join). By 1954, the ECSC had
removed most barriers to trade in coal, coke, steel and pig
iron.15 The central institution was the High Authority,
which had the power to establish national quotas and fine
companies that violated ECSC regulations.
14 Alan Palmer, The Penguin Dictionary of Twentieth Century
History, (Penguin Books: 1982).
15 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th Edition (1989), s.v.
"European Coal and Steel Community".
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1II. 3. THE FOUNDATION OF THE EEC
In 1955, the Benelux states called for the establishment of
a general common market and of institutions that would
provide the foundations of an "economic community". The
inter-governmental Spaak Committee was set up to study the
specifics of these proposals. After the Committee had
presented its findings in 1956, the governments of the six
ECSC countries agreed to draw up two treaties to create "a
general common market and an atomic energy community". 6
Following several months of negotiations, these treaties
were signed by the six governments in Rome in 1957 and
ratified by their respective parliaments in 1958. The EEC
and Euratom (the atomic energy agency) came into being on
January 1, 1958.
The immediate objective of the new organization was a
customs union in which commodity tariffs between member
countries would be eliminated. However, the Treaty of Rome
also worked towards the broader goal of a common market in
which factors of production could move freely across
" Swann, op. cit.
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borders. In addition, the Treaty recognized the possibility
of an eventual economic union with its concomitant
coordination of monetary and fiscal policies between
nations.
III. 4. 1958-69
This period saw a fairly rapid development of the EEC
system. Internal tariffs and quotas were either eliminated
or gradually reduced by agreement among the member
countries; they were totally eliminated in July 1968.'1 The
Common External Tariff (CET) was introduced by averaging
member state duty rates. The Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) was another prominent initiative of the period. The
members also worked towards the free movement of factors.
The governing councils of the EEC, ECSC and Euratom were
merged in July 1967.18
" Gary C. Hufbauer, "An Overview", in ed. Gary, C. Hufbauer,
Europe 1992: An American Perspective, (Brookings Institution,
1990).
18 Ibid.
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III. 5. 1969-85
The first EMU resolution was passed at the Hague Summit of
1969. At the same time, the member heads of state declared
that the Treaty of Rome objectives had been attained. This
meeting also marked the solidification of the "summit"
system in which major issues in EEC policy came to be
debated at meetings of member heads of state. The
arrangement was formalized in 1974 with the creation of the
European Council, which consisted of the heads of states,
their foreign ministers and selected officials. In 1979,
the European Monetary System was created, along with the
European Currency Unit (ECU) and the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM).
A significant characteristic of the period was the evolution
of consensus-based decision making among members -- a single
dissident country could veto a major new measure. Adopted
in 1966 at the insistence of de Gaulle," the trend towards
this mode of decision making was accentuated by the rise in
the importance of the European Parliament, which had
19 Colchester and Buchan, op. cit.
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gradually acquired greater power over the Community budget
and was often at odds with the European Council. By the
late seventies, budget wrangles were commonplace and few new
initiatives arose. Europe in general was entering a period
of difficult economic times, and commentators were referring
to the European situation by the term "Eurosclerosis".
On a more optimistic note, the EEC was expanded to twelve
members during this period. The UK joined (after extensive
negotiations) in 1973; Ireland and Denmark joined in the
same year. Greece was admitted in 1981, and Spain and
Portugal were the last to join in 1986.20
III. 6. THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
In 1979, the first direct elections to the European
Parliament were held. The move to direct election was a
clear sign of the increasingly activist role adopted by this
assembly, as well as the growing involvement of the national
electorates of the member countries. Frustration with
20 A. Bloomfield, "The Historical Setting", eds. L. B. Krause
and W. S. Salant, European Monetary Unification and its Meaning for
the United States, (Brookings Institution: 1973).
20
"Eurosclerosis" led the first directly elected Parliament to
produce a draft treaty establishing a European Union that
would have more far-reaching powers than the present system
allowed. The Parliament adopted the European Union Treaty
(EUT) in 1984.
Meanwhile, the European Council was considering a similar
move. In 1981, Germany and Italy submitted a draft European
Act designed to further the cause of integration; this led
to the Solemn Declaration on European Union, which was
signed by the heads of state at Stuttgart in 1983. The
influential Dooge Committee was set up at the Fontainebleau
Summit in 1984 to study how the EC's situation could be
improved in the spirit of the Solemn Declaration. Following
the recommendations of the Dooge Committee, an Inter-
Governmental Conference (IGC) was established to negotiate a
European Union treaty. In 1985, the famous Cockfield White
Paper on removing barriers to trade was released by the
European Commission. The White Paper identified hundreds of
actions to be taken by the EC if its trade regimes were to
21
be liberalized,21 and provided an impetus to the
deliberations of the IGC. The findings of the IGC were
submitted at the Luxembourg Summit at the end of 1985, and
were embodied in the Single European Act of 1986. This Act,
which took effect on July 1, 1987, formed the basis of the
movement towards 1992.
The basic purpose of the Single European Act was to revise
the 1957 Treaty of Rome and provide a basis for the common
future development of the EC. The first major component of
the Act was a limiting of the old consensus mode of decision
making to specified group of issues such as taxation and
immigration." In doing so, the Act established the concept
of supranationality as an essential component of Community-
wide policy. Further, it introduced the idea of "mutual
recognition", whereby all member governments had to
recognize the commercial and business legislation of other
member governments. Overall standards for such legislation,
however, were to be set in Brussels via a majority voting
21 EC Commission, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper
from the Commission to the European Council (Luxembourg: 1985).
22 Colchester and Buchan, op. cit.
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system. The Act also strengthened the powers of the
European Parliament to influence Community legislation.
Another critical component was a reaffirmation of the
commitment to EMU (the UK was the last of the twelve members
to commit itself to the first stage of EMU -- accession to
the ERM -- at the 1989 Madrid Summit).
If the spirit of the movement towards 1992 is embodied in
the Single European Act, its flesh and blood can be found in
the Cockfield White Paper. The White Paper is essentially
a blueprint and timetable for the for the road to 1992. It
lists initiatives in areas ranging from industrial standards
to banking, and from food to pharmaceuticals." In the
years after the adoption of the Act in 1987, many of the
Cockfield recommendations were transformed into policy in
the form of European Commission directives that were adopted
by the European Council. Section IV is devoted to a
discussion of some of the EC legislation applicable to the
banking industry.
23 Hufbauer, op. cit.
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III. 7. AN ANALYTICAL DIGRESSION
At this point, it is useful to recall the "policy network"
paradigm described in Section II above. This framework can
be applied very successfully to the events described in the
earlier subsections. The original system was designed to
study networks within a country,24 but it can easily be
extended to the EC if individual states are regarded as
"sectors" within the Community. While a detailed historical
analysis is beyond the scope of the paper, a few general
remarks are helpful to an understanding of EC policy
formulation.
The path leading up to the Single European Act provides a
good example of policy networks in action. It is well known
that Margaret Thatcher was opposed to most moves that sought
to bring the EC closer together and reduce the veto powers
of individual members (Stanley Hoffman has compared her to
de Gaulle in this respect) .25 At the 1985 Milan Summit, she
was supported in her opposition to such moves by Denmark;
24 Atkinson and Coleman, op. cit.
25 Hoffman, op. cit.
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France and Italy formed a network in favor of a "European
Union". Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi's call for a
conference on the issue was adopted by a seven to three
majority despite her opposition.
The origins of this "coup"2"lay in the general aura of
"Eurosclerosis" that pervaded the EC in the late seventies
and early eighties. Ironically, it was Mrs Thatcher's lack
of support for the CAP and her wrangles over the UK's
contribution to the EC budget that provided one of the first
thrusts towards what eventually became the Single European
Act. The European Council responded in 1980 to the UK's
objections by directing the European Commission to
investigate non-farming initiatives that might be of greater
benefit to the UK. The resulting Thorn Report concluded
that comprehensive non-agricultural initiatives were
possible only if the EC committed itself to a wide range of
programs spanning technology, economic, financial and
industrial policies. Although the report was not acted
upon, the idea of a more integrated EC received a new lease
on life.
26 Colchester and Buchan, op. cit.
25
Another step towards the Act came in 1983 when the European
Commission proposed a modification of EC voting. The
objective was to dilute the consensus system and move
towards a majority voting arrangement; the rationale was
that with the entry of Spain and Portugal the old system had
become unwieldy. Although turned down by the Council, this
proposal was taken up again during the negotiations for the
Single Act.
Both these examples can be interpreted in terms of the
policy network paradigm. The early eighties saw a clear
division of EC members into rival policy networks that
opposed greater integration on the one hand (UK, Denmark)
and supported integration on the other (France, Italy,
Luxembourg). Negotiations between these rival networks were
complicated by the interests of a third network -- the
bureaucrats of the Commission. The eventual "Europe 1992"
programs were the result of involved negotiations between
these networks.
26
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR BANKING
In the banking context, the Europe 1992 movement is designed
to be a retail phenomenon." The objective of the 1992
banking legislation is to create a system of "universal
banking", in that customers should be free to avail of a
full range of commercial and investment banking services
within the EC across national frontiers.2" This is in
keeping with similar measures to liberalize the securities
and insurance industries in the EC.2  The rationale for
such a system is a substantial reduction in service costs
for consumers and an increase in industry efficiency that
will enable EC-based banks to compete more effectively
against US and Japanese rivals.3* While the struggle to
adopt the principle of universal banking proceeded within
the European Council and the Parliament on fairly partisan
27 Colchester and Buchan, op. cit.
28 Carter H. Golembe and David S. Holland, "Banking and
Securities", in Gary C. Hufbauer, ed., Europe 1992: An American
Perspective (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990).
29 Swann, op. cit.
30 Cecchini, et al., Completing the Internal Market.
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lines, economic considerations emerged as a deciding
factor.31 An influential EC study published the following
estimates of potential consumer savings:32
TABLE 1
POSSIBLE IMPACTS ON THE PRICES OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS THROUGH
COMPLETION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET
COUNTRY POTENTIAL THEORETICAL PRICE REDUCTION
(PERCENTAGES)
SPAIN 34
ITALY 29
FRANCE 24
BELGIUM 23
GERMANY 25
LUXEMBOURG 17
UNITED KINGDOM 13
NETHERLANDS 9
31 Financial Times, April 14, 1991.
32 Michael Emerson, et. al., The Economics of 1992 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990).
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A prerequisite for such a system of liberalized universal
banking is the absence of restrictions on capital movements
across EC borders. As of 1990, eight EC nations have lifted
most of their exchange restrictions. Spain and Ireland have
the right to retain theirs until 1992, and Spain and
Portugal have until 1995 to do away with them. In this
section the EC legislation governing the banking component
of the 1992 agreements will be described. The first
subsection briefly details some pre-1992 measures, after
which the Banking Directives and EMU are described in the
subsequent subsections.
IV. 1. PRE-1992 MEASURES
The Treaty of Rome and its subsequent amendments have paid
specific attention to the financial sector by relaxing
various capital restrictions." A gradual process of
relaxation by individual countries was crowned in 1979 by
13 EC Commission, European File: Towards a Big Internal Market
in Financial Services (Luxembourg: 1987).
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the UK's relaxation of all exchange controls."'
The EC Directive of 1973 abolished certain restrictions on
banking services. The First Banking Directive of 1977 was
the first move to establish EC-wide standards for the
industry." The Directive suggested that minimum capital
requirements and reserve ratios be set up for banks. The
1983 Consolidated Supervision Directive required members to
become involved in a process of mutual supervision. In
addition, it specified that the accounts, exposure and
management of banks should be reviewed on a consolidated
basis every year (thus extending its coverage to bank
holding companies). The main stress of pre-1992 banking
legislation was to create "universal" standards that all EC
members were to follow; as could be expected, the member
countries found it hard to agree on standards.
* By 1989 countries such as the Netherlands, UK and Germany
had removed all capital movement restrictions; the EC Directive of
1988 (which came into effect on July 1, 1990) was designed to
remove all other restrictions.
3 Golembe and Carter, op. cit.
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IV. 2. PRINCIPLES OF THE 1992 MEASURES
As described in section three, the 1992 program had its
immediate origin in the White Paper o
context, the White Paper recognized t
universal standards for banking and s
"mutual recognition".36 According to t
members had to recognize each others'
there would be no attempt to impose r
a whole (although certain "core" or b
be established to protect investors,
consumers). However, this relaxation
an intermediate stage on the ultimate
regulations.
f 1985. In the banking
he problems of imposing
witched to a concept of
his concept all EC
banking standards, and
egulations on the EC as
asic standards were to
depositors and
was theoretically
road to universal
just
IV. 3. THE 1989 BANKING DIRECTIVE (Second Banking Directive)
The Second Banking Directive is the heart of the 1992
banking program. Taking the First Banking Directive, the
Consolidated Supervision Directive and other pre-1992
measures as a base, the Second Directive concentrated on the
3 EC Commission, Completing the Internal Market.
31
"single license" concept and set out the full spectrum of
banking activities that are to be regulated under the 1992
program. The Directive was adopted by the European Council
on June 19, 1989 and is scheduled to come into effect on
January 1, 1993."
The "single license" concept builds on the mutual
recognition idea of the 1985 White Paper and the Single
European Act. According to this concept, a bank (described
in the Directive as a "credit institution") licensed in one
EC country is automatically allowed to operate and establish
branches in the other member countries. In other words, in
order to receive permission to operate a bank on an EC-wide
basis, a single application in one member country is all
that is required. While the home country retains primary
supervisory responsibility, the host countries can oversee
the activities of "foreign" EC-country banks and regulate
their liquidity, risk profile and other operational details.
The commitment of the EC heads of state to the "single
3 EC Commission, The 1992 Banking System (Brussels: EC
Commission, 1991).
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license" idea was reaffirmed in the Rome Communique of
1990."
The Second Directive describes the banking activities under
its jurisdiction in considerable detail. These activities
include conventional banking operations such as the
acceptance of deposits, payment systems such as credit cards
and travellers' or bankers' checks, custody services, credit
reference services and the making of loans in consumer,
mortgage or other areas. In addition, the Directive
explicitly includes trading (on own or client account) in
areas such as spot and forward foreign exchange, foreign
exchange futures and options, financial futures and options
and various forms of corporate securities. It also covers
share issuance activities, portfolio and risk management as
well as other brokerage services." Furthermore, the
Directive gives the EC Commission the power to include more
categories of business if necessary. It is important to
note that the single license freedom does not apply to
institutions that are involved in one or more of the
38 Financial Times, March 4, 1991.
39 EC Commission, The 1992 Banking System.
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activities covered by the Second Directive but that do not
have the status of a credit institution in at least one of
the member countries. The Directive requires a corporation
to have a minimum initial capital endowment of five million
ECU in order to qualify as a parent credit institution.
However, once the parent has been set up no further deposits
are required to set up branches in the home country or the
host countries (this is a significant change).'*
The Directive is regarded by some observers as being
supportive of the trend towards mergers that is currently
occupies the European banking scene." This is not very far
from the truth, as the Directive is quite vague on the
subject of bank holding companies and the approval process
for acquisitions and the creation of subsidiaries. It does
not establish any guidelines to govern corporate eligibility
requirements for bank ownership, nor does it set out rules
governing the foundation of subsidiaries.
The Directive also has important implications for non-EC
40 Ibid.
4 Financial Times, February 23, 1991.
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banks. In particular, it does not cover branches
established by banks based in non-EC countries, unless the
banks operate a fully incorporated subsidiary within an EC
country. In order to be able to establish such a subsidiary
and be in a position to benefit from the single license
provision, a non-EC bank must seek permission from the host
country. This permission, however, can only be granted if
the host country meets the EC's "reciprocity"
requirements. 2 These require the non-EC host to provide a
range of equivalent banking privileges to EC-based banks, in
areas such as market access, equality of regulation and a
"level playing field" in terms of general competitive
conditions. The European Commission provides guidance to
the EC members on the question of whether a given country
meets these reciprocity requirements, although the final
decision rests with the EC Council of Ministers. It should
be noted that the reciprocity concept does not apply to
direct branches of non-EC banks. This implies that a non-EC
bank can open a branch in an EC host if the host grants
permission without reference to the European Commission; the
reciprocity concept (and Commission oversight) is applied
42 EC Commission, The 1992 Banking System.
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only if the bank in question seeks the benefits of the
single license freedom.
The Second Banking Directive will not come into effect until
the Own Funds Directive and the Solvency Ratios Directive
have been fully complied with. This is in keeping with the
1992 program's objective of harmonizing core or essential
regulations. The Own Funds Directive establishes a
standardized definition of bank capital, while the Solvency
Ratios Directive calls for "a minimum ratio of eight percent
between bank capital and risk-weighted assets"."
An interesting potential effect of the 1992 banking program
is the creation of competition between the banking
environments of the various EC members. The temporary
abandonment of the old drive for harmonization of
regulations has created a situation where multiple legal
frameworks are allowed to exist in the face of mutual
recognition of regulations. EC banks are free to operate in
member countries without fear of nationalist barriers to
entry. This could create an incentive for national
1 Golembe and Holland, op. cit.
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governments to create legislation that is attractive to
foreign banks in an attempt to lure them into establishing
domestic branches or subsidiaries. In some cases, a bank
might even be persuaded to move its entire organization.
One resulting scenario could be an international
specialization by product or industry. For example, London
might come to dominate securities markets while Frankfurt
controlled longer term finance. The potential trend towards
competition between national legislative systems could
complicate the EMU drive for a European central bank. This
is because aggregative macroeconomic policy making could be
complicated by rapidly changing and competing regulatory
environments in the member countries."
IV. 4. THE THREE STAGES OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (EMU)
The EMU is expected to provide the backdrop for most
economic activity in Western Europe after 1992. While
separate from the actual 1992 agreements, the EMU is
intended to be an integral component of the movement for
" "A European Central Bank?" (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business
School Case 9-390-185, 1990).
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unification in Western Europe. Countries such as Italy and
France are proponents of this activist program, while others
such as Germany and the UK remain cautious. The EMU process
of economic integration is divided into three stages:
(i) The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM): This is an
arrangement under which all eleven EC currencies are pegged
to the deutschmark. The ERM establishes a band of
fluctuation around the base peg (plus or minus six percent
for the pound and peseta, plus or minus 2.25 percent for the
rest)." The actual parity value for each currency is
adjusted periodically through an EC negotiating process.
The UK was the last to join on October 8, 1990,46 and the
first phase of EMU is regarded as having been successfully
completed. A descendant of the old "snake" and the European
Monetary System (EMS), the current ERM has been remarkably
successful.
(ii) Monetary and fiscal coordination: This second stage of
EMU is scheduled to be established by December 31, 1994.
4' Financial Times, March 11, 1991
46 The Economist, March 9, 1991.
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The European Commission and countries such as France and
Italy favor the establishment of a "Eurofed" in this phase,
but the UK and Germany want this to occur in the third
phase. The European Council's 1990 Rome Communique lists
the tasks of a potential Eurofed as including the
coordination of national monetary policy, the development of
monetary instruments for a future single monetary policy,
and the promotion of the ECU.' This phase is also expected
to see the completion of the adjustments required by the
Banking Directives.
(iii) Establishment of a single currency: This is to be
established by 1997.
" Financial Times, March 20, 1991.
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V. TRENDS IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
This section addresses some important trends in the
competitive situation of the international banking
environment. The main ideas discussed here involve new
forms of bank organization and the movement towards
disintermediation in international financial markets. These
trends have a significant impact on the EC in general and
the UK and Germany in particular. The discussion is
intended to fill out the study from the perspective of the
two Porter models introduced in section 11.48
V. 1. CHANGES IN BANK ORGANIZATION
The increasing specialization and sophistication of
financial activity has created a difficult situation for
traditional banks. The complexities of finance and
information technology have created a business environment
where smaller and more focused firms are leveraging off
specialist skills to erode the competitive positions of
48 Porter, Competitive Strategy and The Competitive Advantage
of Nations.
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their larger rivals."
The response of major banks to this new threat has been to
attempt to create more advanced in-house skill levels,
resulting in fierce competition for scarce skilled labor.
However, a larger and more ponderous organization usually
finds it hard to compete on a one-on-one basis with small
specialist competitors. For example, many European banking
giants have lost out to US investment banking specialists in
getting a share of the new surge in merger deals in Western
Europe. "*
Some observers have suggested that in order to compete the
large European retail banks will have to adopt a "federated"
structure in order to capture the gains from smaller and
more focused firm organization.51 This would involve
"creating separate business units in areas where
specialization is the best way to compete, while keeping
49 Lowell L. Bryan, "The Role of Banking in Society", McKinsey
Quarterly, (1990/3).
50 Financial Times, October 4, 1990.
51 E. von Lohneysen, et al., "Emerging Roles in European Retail
Banking", McKinsey Quarterly, (1990/3).
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selected functions at a central level where their
centralization adds value."52 This implies creating fairly
autonomous subsidiaries along functional or product lines,
while restricting large volume and low margin operations to
the corporate level.
This trend has differing impacts on different countries.
The UK and the US are better equipped to take advantage of
specialization, owing to their more competitive and flexible
industry structures. Countries such as Germany and France,
however, have a more traditional banking environment that is
less receptive to the "federated banking" trend. In these
countries banking tends to be more intermediary based and
less flexible. As the following subsection will show,
modern banking trends have placed traditional banking
systems at a competitive disadvantage. With the entry of
the 1992 program, traditional banking environments become
even more vulnerable as they can no longer rely on national
regulations to keep more flexible rivals out of their
markets."
5 Ibid.
3 Emerson, et al., The Economics of 1992.
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V. 2. SECURITIZATION AND DISINTERMEDIATION
The trend towards changing bank organization is accentuated
by the concomitant shift towards securitization and
disintermediation in international financial markets.
Before discussing these trends, however, it is useful to
consider two "systems" of classifying national banking
environments. The first of these was introduced by John
Zysman."' According to Zysman, national banking
environments could be classified as either market driven or
"administered credit" systems. The former is characterized
by short-term perspectives, arms-length transactions and
highly competitive capital markets. The US, and to a lesser
extent the UK are good examples. An administered credit
system, on the other hand, typically has a longer term
business outlook that relies on long-standing client
relationships rather arms-length transactions. Capital
markets tend to be less well developed and more
oligopolistic. The French and German banking industries
fall into this category.
5 John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial
Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1983).
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An alternative classification is provided by Alabanese,
Lessard and Perotti.5 ' They classify financial systems as
security market systems and intermediary-based systems. The
former has a "relatively strong reliance on external finance
through markets with limited government intervention. "56
There is a clear separation between industry and finance and
relationships tend to be short-term. Again, the US and UK
systems fall into this category. The market based system is
regarded as more sophisticated than the intermediary-based
system, as its more competitive character implies fewer
barriers to entry and a more efficient mechanism to spread
risk and mobilize capital. In the intermediary-based
environment industry and finance are more closely linked
through informal and institutional relationships that stress
a longer term perspective (as in Zysman's administered
credit system). Banks often take on equity positions in
their client firms, and have a much stronger influence on
company operations.
55 Tomaso Alabanese, Donald Lessard and Enrico Perotti,
"Strategic Responses to the Integration of European Financial
Markets: Cross Border Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances in
Commercial Banking", [Draft], Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, March 1991.
5' Ibid.
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One of the most important trends in international finance is
the shift towards securitization. This involves moving away
from intermediary-based banking relationships towards direct
access to security markets. More and more firms choose to
solicit funds by issuing securities on the open capital
markets rather than through loans from banks that are based
on collateral, frequent renegotiation and long-term
rollovers." Securitization is catching on because it
allows "greater diversification and liquidity and
diversification of corporate assets."58 This trend has also
accentuated the trend towards greater financial
specialization, as new financial technologies are developed
to meet the wide variety of consumer needs on the
international markets. The process of securitization is
accompanied by a complementary process of disintermediation,
as more traditional banking relationships are discarded in
favor of short-term, transaction-based banking
relationships.
5 Donald Lessard and Enrico Perotti, "Moving Towards 1992:
Managing the Internationalization of Ownership and Corporate
Finance" in Lessard and Antonelli, eds., Managing the Globalization
of Business (Milan: 1990).
58 Albanese, et al., op. cit.
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Increased financial specialization combined with the trend
towards securitization and disintermediation has placed
traditional intermediary-based banking systems at a
competitive disadvantage."' As mentioned earlier, these
factors are accentuated by the 1992 programs as well as by
the longer term effects of the EMU. In a country such as
Germany the banking industry will have to substantially
alter its business practices if it is to compete against
smaller and more specialized rivals who are no longer kept
out by government regulations on the national level and
long-term relationships on the industry level.
5 Lessard and Perotti, op. cit.
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VI. THE GERMAN BANKING ENVIRONMENT
Germany is an interesting country to study in terms of the
policy network and strong state/weak state frameworks. In
terms of Katzenstein's classification,'* Germany would
probably fall in the intermediate zone between the US and
France. However, in the banking area the government's
control seems much stronger. This finding is corroborated
in the policy network context:61 as will be seen later, the
Bundesbank, Ministry of Finance and the major banks are
closely linked by informal ties. The independent central
reserve bank (Bundesbank) is one of the most influential
players on the German financial scene.
As Section V indicated, German banking is expected to
undergo profound changes in the near future. The drive
towards securitization and disintermediation will inevitably
influence the major German banks, their smaller rivals as
60 P. Katzenstein, "Introduction" and "Conclusion" in
Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Wisconsin: 1978).
61 M. Atkinson and W. Coleman, "Strong States and Weak States:
Sectoral Policy Networks", British Journal of Political Science, 19
(1989).
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well as the Bundesbank. This will be reinforced by the
increasing sophistication of financial and information
technologies. If the accompanying trend towards "federal"
banking62 also influences Germany, the overall result could
be a complete alteration in the way German banks do
business.
The traditional German banking environment is an
administered credit or intermediary based system." Banks
tend to have long established relationships with their
clients (in some cases going back to the nineteenth
century), and the financing relationship resembles a
partnership between industry and finance. There are
significant entry barriers for less well established banks,
and lesser known customers can have a difficult time
accessing financing. Capital is generally provided on a
frequently renegotiated, rollover basis. Banks often assume
equity positions in their clients' companies, and both
industry and finance have close formal and informal links to
62 von Lohneysen, et al., "Emerging Roles".
63 Zysman, op. cit. and Alabanese, et al., "Strategic
Responses."
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government authorities. However, as the following
subsections will show, this established pattern appears to
be changing. In order to understand why, it is first
necessary to consider Germany's unusual macroeconomic
situation.
VI. 1. MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The major "new" factor in Germany is obviously the
unification of the Federal Republic and the GDR. The costs
of integration have resulted in a current account deficit
equal to three percent of GDP as of February 1991.64 The
deutschmark is under severe pressure, and inflationary
tendencies are building. High unemployment and inflation
have already appeared in the east, and the Bundesbank has
driven up interest rates in response. Unification is
expected to cost the federal government between $147 and
$586 billion over the next ten years."
The weakness of the deutschmark has reduced the ability of
" Financial Times, April 13, 1991.
6 Euromoney, April 1990.
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the other ERM countries to reduce interest rates, which has
created frictions in EC ranks (especially with France).66
These frictions also arose in the recent G-7 meeting in
April, when the US expressed disapproval of the Bundesbank's
independent decision to prop up interest rates in spite of
the German federal government's reluctance. 7
VI. 2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In general, Federal banking laws are far more liberal than
the US or UK, although there is a very strict accreditation
process and legal penalties are very severe. There is no
German equivalent of the US Glass-Steagall Act, so that
banks are free to pursue most lines of business in the
financial markets.
The equity markets are relatively under developed and are
largely controlled by the major credit banks. An
interesting measure of bank influence on equity markets is
" Financial Times, March 6, 1991.
67 Peter Norman, Stephen Fidler and Peter Riddell, "US, Germany
Fail to Solve Dispute Over Interest Rates", Financial Times, April
29, 1991.
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the proxy voting practice followed by many individual and
institutional investors in corporate securities. In this
system, the owners of securities allow their banks to vote
by proxy on the shares they own. This dramatically
increases the influence of the banks on corporate policy, as
they control not only their own shares but also those of
many third-party investors. The major credit banks also
have significant cross-holdings in each others' shares,
enabling them to present a fairly unified front on policy
issues.
The banking system is divided into three groups of banks:
the credit banks, the savings banks and the cooperative
banks. A small fourth category -- that of specialty banks -
- concentrates mainly on rich individual investors.
The private sector credit banks are closely monitored by the
Bundesbank. A large number of trade associations and
lobbying groups link them with the Ministry of Finance and
the Bundesbank. A complex system of interlocking
directorships links the major banks and results in a high
51
degree of cohesion on political issues.'" The "Big Three"
credit banks are Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and Dresdner
Bank. There are 163 regional credit banks, 57 branches of
foreign banks and 86 other private banks registered in the
country.'' The credit banking market has high barriers to
entry, both for foreign banks as well as for new domestic
banks (owing to the strictness of the accreditation
procedures and the informal barriers created by inter-
relationships between established banks, their clients and
the government).
The non-profit savings banks (often associated with
individual towns) operate under the supervision of their own
central bank, and have stringent lending policies. There
are ten branches of the savings central bank in the German
states (lander), and 585 registered savings banks around the
country. The cooperative bank system is also supervised by
its own central bank, and approximates the functions of
68 Chris Allen "Democratic Politics and Private Investment:
Financial Regulation in the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United States," (American Center for Contemporary German Studies:
Research Report #2, November 1990).
69 Figures on numbers of German banks are taken from the
Bundesbank's 1990 Annual Report.
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savings and loans institutions in the US. There are five
regional branches of the cooperative central bank and 3358
registered cooperative banks.7*
VI. 3. COMPETITIVE SITUATION
The "Big Three" of German commercial banking have long
enjoyed a comfortable oligopoly position. As of September
1990, their assets stood at DM 350 billion, DM 248 billion
and DM 180 billion respectively and they controlled 33
percent of the volume of financial transactions on the
German markets. In recent months, however, this has
changed as unification and the prospect of EC 1992 have
altered the competitive scene for German banks. The Big
Three are competing fiercely in their attempts to expand in
the east, and have taken short term losses that have enabled
their smaller domestic rivals to catch up. Dresdner Bank
and Commerzbank reported very small gains in 1990 net
operating profits, and Deutsche Bank took a loss.72 In
70 Ibid.
71 The Economist, September 1, 1990.
72 Financial Times, April 15, 1991.
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contrast, the next eight largest banks saw their average
operating profits rise by 20 percent." The following table
shows some of these 1990 results (the figures represent
total rather than net operating profits):
" Ibid.
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TABLE 2
1990 GERMAN BANK RESULTS (DM)
BANK
Deutsche Bank
Dresdner Bank
Commerzbank
Bayerische
Vereinsbank
Bayerische Hypo
TOTAL OPERATING PROFIT
5. 13b
na
na
na
1. 07b
NET INCOME
1. 07b
921m
557m
360
(-20.4%)
(+42%)
(-.01%)
(+21.3%)
313m (+10%)
Note: Dresdner Bank's figures reflect the
reacquisition of prewar assets in the east.
SOURCE: FINANCIAL TIMES, APRIL 15, 1991.
The increased competitiveness has spread to retail areas
affected by the Second Banking Directive (such as credit
cards).
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As of August 1990, the Big Three had $20b in loans to the
former GDR lander." This eastern expansion shows no sign
of abatement. Deutsche Bank paid one billion deutschmarks
for an 85 percent stake in a joint venture with Deutsche
Kreditbank (formerly part of the Staatsbank, the GDR's
commercial bank monopoly)." It also paid a hundred million
deutschmarks to acquire 18 former Staatsbank branches under
its own name. Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank have similar
ventures. This new competitiveness has also entered their
more conventional businesses: for example, the credit card
area has seen new marketing and brand-name initiatives. It
is interesting to note that the difficulties of the Big
Three have resulted in a decline in their stock prices since
January 1991.
Another interesting competitive development is the extension
of the Big Three into new lines of business. A prime
example is their foray into the field of insurance
(allfinanz). Deutsche Bank has a new life insurance
subsidiary called Deutsche Lebensversicherung. Dresdner
74 Euromoney, January, 1991.
75 The Economist, September 1, 1990.
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Bank has allied with Allianz, Germany's largest insurance
company (Allianz has acquired an undisclosed share in
Dresdner Bank) . 7
VI. 4. EC-LINKED CHANGES
As the EC nations begin complying with the liberalizations
called for by the Second Banking Directive, new
international rivals have begun to threaten German banks.
In response, the German banking lobby has successfully
pressurized the Finance Ministry into allowing banks to
enter other businesses in a big way; as described earlier,
insurance is a primary example. In other areas, the banking
lobby has been equally assiduous in opposing new
legislation. For example, the German banks fiercely oppose
legislation legalizing money market funds; if successfully
adopted this legislation could potentially halve banking
profits and expose the banks to international competition in
an area where they have relatively little experience." At
the same time, some of the major German banks are taking
7' The Economist, September 1, 1990.
77 Ibid.
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advantage of newly relaxed legislation in other EC countries
to enter strategic partnerships. For example, Dresdner Bank
plans a cross shareholding arrangement with France's Banque
Nationale de Paris (BNP) and Commerzbank is considering a
similar deal with Credit Lyonnaise.'"
In general, German banking circles seem rather wary of the
entire EC 1992 program. Some writers have interpreted this
as a fear of the process of "disintermediation" that is
expected to accompany it.7" This conservatism appears to be
shared by the Bundesbank and its former chairman. Otto Pohl
recently compared EMU to its avian namesake, describing it
as slow moving and incapable of flight.80 The Bundesbank's
wariness has been reinforced by Germany's recent
macroeconomic problems as well as internal political
difficulties (Pohl was reputed to disagree with Kohl and
Hans Dietrich Gentscher on EC issues; in addition, his move
to reduce the number of lander central banks was under
7 Financial Times, April 15, 1991.
9 Donald Lessard and Enrico Perotti, "Moving Toward 1992:
Managing the Internationalization of Ownership and Corporate
Finance," in Lessard and Antonelli, eds., Managing the
Globalization of Business (Milan: 1990).
80 Financial Times, May 1, 1991.
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considerable fire).si The Federal government has supported
its banking circles in opposing rapid reform on the EMU
front; in particular, it is opposed to the setting up of a
"Eurofed" in the second phase of EMU.8 2 Former Bundesbank
chairman Pohl went on record stating that the existing EC
committee of central bank governors could fulfil the role of
a central bank for the time being.a3
81 Financial Times, April 15, 1991.
82 Financial Times, March 6. 1991.
83 Financial Times, March 20, 1991.
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VII. THE UK BANKING SCENE
Like Germany, the UK probably falls in the middle ground of
Katzenstein's strong state/weak state spectrum. Another
point of similarity lies in the closeness of the policy
networks, as will be seen below. However, the fundamental
difference between the two systems is the fact that the UK
has a market based (securities market) banking regime. The
British financial markets are far more short-term oriented
and transaction driven than their German counterparts. As a
result, the UK banking system is near the leading edge of
the trend toward securitization and disintermediation.
Another point of difference is the fact that the Bank of
England is not an independent entity like the German
Bundesbank, as its activities are controlled by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
VII. 1. MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The UK is almost chronically stricken by recession, rising
unemployment and sticky interest rates. In addition,
inflation is picking up again and the budget has gone back
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into deficit. These problems are complicated by the demand
for more liberal fiscal policies in the wake of Mrs
Thatcher's departure.
VII. 2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Banking and securities activity in the UK is regulated by
the Securities and Investment Board (SIB), which has a role
similar to the SEC (although the SIB has much wider
jurisdiction). The SIB sets up Self Regulating
Organizations (SRO's), and every bank must belong to an SRO.
These bodies act as policy networks in miniature, as their
membership remains fairly constant and has representatives
from the banks, the SIB and the government. In general, the
pattern of regulation has been fairly loose, and UK
financial policy has usually favored City of London
interests. Historically, finance-industry relationships
have been short-term oriented and the industrial sector has
frequently complained about the lack of "patient capital".
In addition, the UK government has traditionally supported
the financial sector's desire for a strong pound sterling
with its notorious "stop and go" macroeconomic policies,
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which have hindered the ability of UK businesses to compete
internationally.84
The banks themselves are divided into commercial banks,
merchant banks and building societies (these societies serve
the same function as thrifts in the US). The five largest
commercial banks" are known as "clearing banks" (the
equivalent of "money center" banks).
VII. 3. COMPETITIVE SITUATION
UK banks are going through a tough period. In 1990, the top
twenty banks all reported losses or declining profits from
their core businesses."* Many of them are seeing staff
cutbacks, and bank stocks are not doing well. Midland Bank
was forced to announce a 50 percent cut in dividends, and
its chairman had to step down."' Big banks like National
Westminster, Barclays, Lloyds & Midland are losing business
84 The Economist, September 8, 1990.
85 LLoyds Bank, National Westminster (Natwest), Barclays Bank,
Midland Bank and Abbey National Bank.
86 The Economist, March 9, 1991.
87 Financial Times, March 6.
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to leaner & smaller rivals in core consumer businesses.
Newer rivals such as Abbey National (the newest of the
clearing banks) are building market share in traditional
consumer areas such as mortgages and personal finance at the
expense of the Big Four clearing banks.8" The competitive
situation of the banking sector is also being hampered by
falling interest rates following the recent cuts in the Bank
of England's base rate. 8 9
VII. 4. EC-LINKED CHANGES
The British members of the European Parliament (EP) have
traditionally been liberal in their political inclinations,
and public opinion has tended to be more pro-EC than the
government would have liked. One important consequence of
this has been the public debate over the role of the Bank of
England (BOE) in the new European situation. Many people
(including prominent members of the EP) appear to support an
enhancement in the Bank's powers, in the belief that a
stronger central bank will facilitate the UK's integration
88 Financial Times, March 2/3, 1991.
89 Ibid.
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into the EC. The governor of the BOE heated up the debate
recently by breaking ranks with the government and publicly
calling for greater independence for the Bank.90 This trend
is ironically supported to some extent by the Conservative
government, which has engaged in liberalization measures in
the financial sector since the mid-eighties.
The UK's bankers appear to be less fearful of the 1992
program than their German counterparts. This is probably
because their businesses are in a better position to take
advantage of the changes brought about by securitization and
disintermediation in the banking industry than their
continental counterparts. Banking circles have been vocal
in their support for the EMU (Lord Alexander, chairman of
Natwest, stated his support for the establishment of the
European central bank in London, and called upon the
government to actively cooperate with 1992 measures and the
EMU).91 City forums have engaged in high profile
discussions of how London could benefit from 1992 (a good
example is the new committee founded by the BOE to look into
90 "Eyebrow Raiser",, The Economist, March 30, 1991.
91 "European Bank Plea", Financial Times, April 29, 1991.
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the legal ramifications of financial liberalization in
Europe) .92 In addition, there is a concerted effort to
reform existing legislation that threatens to harm the UK's
potential as a financial center in an integrated Europe.
Two areas receiving prominent coverage are the Financial
Services Act (which is estimated to cost UK banks over 300
million pounds a year) and IRS regulations.3 On the
business front, UK banks have been quick to take advantage
of falling barriers in other EC countries. For example,
LLoyds has allied with Credit Agricole of France and three
other continental banks in an arrangement that would allow
their customers to tie in with each other's branches.9'
Nevertheless, the UK government remains cautious about the
EC 1992 banking programs as well as the EMU. The government
joined the government of Germany and Spain in stating that
the gap between the economic performance of member states
would have to be narrowed before the second and third stages
92 David Lascelles, "Bank Defends London's Role As Hub",
Financial Times, April 29, 1991.
93 Euromoney, June 1990.
94 "Lloyds Links With Continental Banks", Financial Times,
March 17, 1991.
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of the EMU could be completed.95 John Major (then
Chancellor of the Exchequer) went on record calling for
"clear and objective performance criteria" before further
progress on banking integration and the EMU could be
made." Sir Leon Brittan, the UK's senior EC Commissioner,
supported this stance by stating that the UK could "in good
faith sign an EMU treaty setting up the institutions needed
for a low inflation single currency throughout the EC, but
Parliament could decide nearer the time of implementation
whether Britain should actually participate."97 He drew a
parallel with the European Monetary System (EMS), which was
set up in 1978 with UK support, but which the UK did not
formally join until 1990.
" Financial Times, March 6, 1991.
96 Financial Times, March 13, 1991.
97 Ibid.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The main ideas behind this paper are that important domestic
considerations have the potential to retard the banking
industry's liberalization as envisaged by the 1992 programs.
Once the euphoria of the Single European Act and the 1992
movement began to recede, the EC banking industries and
their home governments had to come to terms with the
profound changes in business practices and political control
that the 1992 programs and the EMU required. This trend is
especially strong in Germany, where political and historical
as well as economic factors serve to make banking circles
suspicious of 1992. In particular, the problems of
unification and the threats of securitization and
disintermediation have placed the major German banks at a
competitive disadvantage.
In the UK the trend is somewhat less clear, with the
government remaining skeptical but the banking industry
coming round in support. Here, the banking industry is more
comfortable with the approaching changes in the
international financial markets owing to its greater market
67
orientation. In both cases, existing policy networks and
individual actors are being forced to adjust to a
comprehensive and potentially far-reaching set of economic
programs that threaten to become a reality in the very near
future. The critical importance of the changing banking
environment lies in the fact that the success of all the
other integrative moves in Europe will depend heavily on the
outcomes of the banking "struggles" described in this paper.
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APPENDIX: ABBREVIATIONS
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CEEC Committee for European Economic Cooperation
CET Common External Tariff
EC European Community
EP European Parliament
ECE Economic Commission for Europe
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ECU European Currency Unit
EEC European Economic Community
EMS European Monetary System
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism
EUT European Union Treaty
IGC Inter-Governmental Conference
OEEC Organization for European Economic
Cooperation
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